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Abstract:  The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman &
Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have
argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be
useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of
metaphysics  can  be  extended  to  the  scientific  field  of  applied  ontology,  which  uses
constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French &
McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic
metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to
exist as a largely autonomous field.
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1. Introduction
According to Ladyman & Ross (2007) (“L&R” hereafter) analytic metaphysics should be
discontinued because of its lack of emphasis on scientific  knowledge that makes it  a
waste  of  intellectual  resources.  Although  most  analytic  metaphysicians1 would
1 Here, we do not take stock on the nature of the relation between analytic metaphysics and 
naturalized metaphysics (e.g. the question of whether the latter is actually a part of the former 
according to some definitions of the fields), although we will argue at the end that analytic 
metaphysics should not be discontinued and can evolve largely independently from metaphysics of 
science.
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presumably  believe  that  their  discipline  has  intrinsic  value insofar  as it  describes  the
actual world or the field of possibilities, L&R deny this. They focus especially on the
appeal of intuitions, and argue that intuitions are the “product of cultural learning” and
that many philosophers “do not share as many intuitions with the folk as they usually
suppose” (Ross, Ladyman & Spurret, 2007, 12). But they do not condemn only the kind
of analytic metaphysics based on intuitions (cf. ibid. 17-27). The scope of their criticism
is  broader,  and  they  seem to  despise  any  form of  metaphysics  which  is  not  firmly
empirically grounded – as when they ask: “Metaphysicians seek to understand the general
composition relation itself. But why suppose that there is any such thing?” (ibid., 21).
Asking when such a thing obtains or not, and whether it is restricted or universal, would
then be a waste  of time.  In short,  according to them “Mathematics  and science have
undoubtedly  borne  fruits  of  great  value;  a  priori  metaphysics  has  achieved  nothing
remotely  comparable,  if  it  has  achieved  anything  at  all”  (ibid.,  16).  From this,  they
conclude that: “No scientist has any reason to be interested in most of the conversation
that now goes on under the rubric of metaphysics” (ibid., 26). 
A popular  answer to this  charge is  the  heuristic  approach to metaphysics offered by
French & McKenzie (2015) (“F&M” hereafter). According to them, analytic metaphysics
develops many methods and tools that already turned out to be useful for philosophy of
physics.  Independently  of  whether  Ladyman  &  Ross  (2007)  are  right  that  analytic
metaphysics lacks any intrinsic value when it comes to the truth2, analytic metaphysics
thereby  remains  a  fruitful  enterprise3. Therefore,  because  of  its  heuristic  value for
philosophy  of physics,  analytic metaphysics  should not be discontinued. For instance,
philosophers of physics working on loop quantum gravity or string theory (e.g. Huggett
&  Wüthrich,  2013),  trying  to  explain  what  it  could  mean  that  space  and  time,  or
2 One could argue that metaphysics has intrinsic value, but that this intrinsic value has nothing 
to do with truth – see for instance Benovsky (2016) who defends the claim that metaphysical views do
have values grounded in their beauty. But we will not consider these forms of value not grounded in 
truth within the scope of this paper.
3 Our only disagreement with Ladyman & Ross in this article is about their claim that analytic 
metaphysics should be discontinued. We are otherwise sympathetic to their claim that special sciences must
be taken into account in order to address metaphysical questions. They raise in particular another 
interesting issue, that we do not address here, about the status of folk metaphysics and what they call 
“notional worlds”.
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relativistic spacetime, are not fundamentally real, will build on theories about emergence,
fundamentality, or metaphysical views on space or time.
The heuristic approach strikes us as a good motivation to accept that we should not dis-
continue analytic metaphysics. In this article, we do not defend, or argue against, the in-
trinsic value of analytic metaphysics; we only discuss the extent of the value of meta-
physics for other domains, and whether constraining research in metaphysics could maxi-
mize this heuristic value. In particular, we complement French’s and McKenzie’s argu-
ment by showing why the heuristic value of metaphysics depends not only on the way it
is  presently  used,  or  could  be  used  in  the  future  by  philosophers  of  contemporary
physics4, but also on the way it is or could be used in applied ontology. Therefore, our
first goal – in section 2 – is to offer new examples of the utility of analytic metaphysics
for other fields. Our second goal – in section 3 – is, taking the first conclusion into ac-
count,  to  elaborate  on  a  parallel  between  the  heuristic  justification  of  analytic  meta-
physics and the instrumental justification of mathematics, in order to argue that analytic
metaphysics could continue to exist as a largely autonomous field.
2. A Toolbox for Applied Ontology
2.1 Applied Ontology
In this section, we argue that we may extend the heuristic justification of analytic meta-
physics beyond philosophy of physics5. We agree with French and McKenzie that ana-
4  “Philosophy of contemporary physics” will denote here the set of philosophical 
investigations on our most fundamental empirically confirmed physical theories since the quantum 
and relativistic revolutions (general relativity, quantum field theory) and all the philosophical 
investigations on the research programs aiming at making at least a step towards a theory of quantum 
gravity (string theory, loop quantum gravity, non-commutative geometries, causal set theory, etc.).
5  Special sciences played a crucial role in this debate since Ladyman & Ross (2007) includes a
chapter devoted to special sciences (see Ross, Ladyman & Collier, chapter 4). The crux of its content 
is that special science ontologies always have, in fine, to be consistent with the ontology of physics. 
As they write (Ross, Ladyman & Collier, 2007, 190): “failure of an interpretation of special science 
generalizations to respect negative implications of physical theory is grounds for rejecting such 
generalizations”. In this perspective, the role of metaphysics, according to them, is to offer a general 
unification of sciences, being granted that physics rules out some otherwise possible ontological 
interpretations of special sciences.
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lytic metaphysics is an important toolbox for the philosophy of physics. But, as we shall
see, analytic metaphysics has other applications in a field of information science named
“applied  ontology”.  The point  is  important  as  it  shows that  analytic  metaphysics  has
many possible applications, and that the methodological constraints that some philoso-
phers of physics may be eager to put on metaphysics are related to physics, and do not
take into account other scientific practices. As we shall see, analytic metaphysics can be
at the same time at odds with physics and extremely useful for applied ontology.
Applied ontologies are structured terminological  frameworks that can be represented as
computer files or more generally in a logical format. One of their aims is to enable se-
mantic interoperability between data concerning the same domain: indeed, various infor-
mation systems use different terminologies and vocabularies, which make their data often
difficult to gather, share or re-use; ontologies aim at providing a unified, structured termi-
nology that can serve as common language between those information systems. Applied
ontologies are formal representations of the various categories of entities in a domain,
and the relations that hold between them. For example, FMA (Foundational Model of
Anatomy; cf. Rosse & Mejino, 2003) is an ontology of human anatomical entities and
their relations; it contains a variety of terms among which Organ, Mitral_valve and Peri-
cardial_sac. Those terms are organized along a taxonomic structure, with formal state-
ments (commonly called “axioms” in the field) involving the is_a relation such as Heart
is_a Organ, which means that every instance of heart is also an instance of organ. But the
ontology also encompasses mereological relations such as  constitutional_part_of or  at-
tached_to, that enable to formalize axioms such as  Mitral_valve constitutional_part_of
Heart. Moreover, the logical properties of these relations, such as transitivity or reflexiv-
ity of the relation part_of, are also specified.
Applied ontologies are nowadays developed and used in a large variety of domains such
as  education  (Mitrovic  & Devedzic  2004)  or  geography  (Mark,  Smith,  Egenhofer  &
Hirtle, 2004). In particular, they are becoming more and more important in biomedical
sciences,  with  a  notable  large  initiative  of  building  ontologies  on  common,  rigorous
metaphysical principles named the “OBO Foundry” (Smith & al., 2007). Such ontologies
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should enable the re-usability of biomedical information contained in journals, clinical
trials and electronic health records by the clinicians and researchers of the domain. But
they must be built on solid bases to enable interoperability, and philosophical ontology
has  an  important  role  to  play  here.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  developing  rigorous  and
exhaustive applied ontologies raises issues very similar to those that are classically raised
by philosophical ontology, and it has become clear that the success of the former will
depend  on  building  upon  the  theories  and  methods  of  the  latter.  In  many  respects,
building a coherent  and solid  applied ontology of biomedicine amounts  to  building a
formalized, philosophical ontology of biomedicine.
We will  now present  two  arguments  with  a  focus  on  the  OBO Foundry  biomedical
applied ontologies as a case study. First, we will argue that metaphysical principles that
are not  particularly associated  with contemporary physics,  but  rather  grounded in the
work  of  analytic  metaphysicians,  can  be  helpful  for  building  biomedical  applied
ontologies. Second, we will argue that it might be too difficult or even counter-productive
to try to build an applied ontology of biomedicine on the basis of contemporary physics.
As we will see, taken together, those arguments show that analytic metaphysics can have
a high heuristic value for building an applied ontology, even if it was developed without
taking into account the lessons of contemporary physics. 
2.2 From analytic metaphysics to applied ontology
Applied ontologies are often based on metaphysical principles that are not inspired by
contemporary physics. These principles are sometimes closer to common sense (and the
naïve physics coming with it) or classical physics.  This is especially obvious in the ap-
plied ontologies that explicitly claim to capture the ontological categories underlying hu-
man common sense and natural language,  such as DOLCE (Descriptive Ontology for
Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering; Gangemi & al., 2002), which is developed to ease
interactions with human agents by “making already formed conceptualizations explicit”
(Masolo & al. 2003).
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Other applied ontologies do not rely as explicitly on human common sense but aim at
providing an ontology compatible with some special sciences such as biomedicine, where
the first aim is not to develop metaphysical principles inspired by contemporary physics.
This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  for  their  largest  part,  many  special  sciences  such  as
biomedicine  do  not  require  the  use of  physical  models  more elaborate  than  naïve  or
classical physics (with a few possible exceptions such as quantum biology – cf. Lambert
& al. 2013).
Consider  the example  of the Basic  Formal  Ontology (BFO; cf.  Smith,  Arp & Spear,
2015), which is used in particular in the context of the above-mentioned OBO Foundry
project that aims at devising a set of interoperable biomedical ontologies. BFO introduces
high-level categories6 such as “occurrent” and “continuant”. Occurrents are entities that
persist through time by having temporal parts, such as the process of the life of a specific
tree. Continuants are entities that persist through time by being wholly present at each
time at  which they exist.  They are divided between independent  continuants,  namely
entities  whose existence  does  not depend on the existence  of another  entity  (such as
material objects, e.g. a leaf) and dependent continuants, namely entities whose existence
depends on the existence of another entity (such as qualities – e.g. the green color of a
leaf – or dispositions – e.g. the fragility of a twig). This distinction between occurrents
and endurants can be traced back to William Johnson, the teacher of Bertrand Russell
(Jansen,  2008),  and  has  benefited  in  contemporary  philosophy  from  Lewis’  (1986)
analysis of “endurance” and “perdurance”. 
BFO also rests on a distinction between universals and particulars – e.g. the universal of a
tree versus this particular tree. Arguably, those distinctions are closer to the constructs
that  may  be  found  in  analytic  metaphysics  than  to  many  forms  of  naturalized
metaphysics; indeed, the broadly Aristotelian inspiration of such an ontology has been
emphasized regularly (Jansen, 2008; Smith & Ceusters, 2010). Grenon (2003) speaks of
Smith (1997) as a “neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of substances”. Furthermore, definitions
in  the  OBO  Foundry  are  expected  to  take  the  “genus-species”  form  of  so-called
6 In this text, we use “category” and “class of entities” as synonymous, with a broad 
understanding of the term “entities” that covers structures.
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“Aristotelian definition”, where an A is defined as a B that C’s, where B is a parent class
of A, and C is the difference characterizing the instances of B which are also instances of
A (Smith & al., 2007) – on the model of Aristotle definition of “human” as an animal that
is rational. Note however that the structured taxonomies developed in the OBO Foundry
far exceed in terms of sophistication and complexity what Aristotle could have produced
– as they capitalize on thousands of years of biomedical sciences.
Note that other ontologies – such as the ones developed in the DOLCE galaxy – do not
endorse  explicitly  the  same  Aristotelian  inspiration,  but  acknowledge  their  debt  to
philosophers such as Strawson, Searle, Simons, Varzi and Casati (Gangemi et al., 2002)
or Quine, Goodman, Sider and Kit Fine (Bottazzi, Ferrario & Masolo, 2012) – many of
which are also cited in the BFO-inspired literature. Finally, relations that are classically
studied in analytic  metaphysics  have attracted considerable attention from the applied
ontology community – such as mereology, sometimes combined with topology (Masolo
& Vieu, 1999; Smith & Mark, 1998).
Such  ontologies  are  then  used  for  various  scientific  projects  of  data  structuring  and
exchange. For example, the ontology CDIM (Clinical Data Integration Model) (Ethier &
al., 2015), which is based on BFO and other OBO Foundry ontologies, has been used in
the context of the TRANSFoRm project (Ethier et al.,  2017), a proof of concept of a
learning health system used to exchange data from five different clinical and genomical
databases  across  four  different  countries,  to  support  retrospective  data  analysis,
prospective recruitment of patients for clinical data trials, and decision aid. This ontology
avoided  classical  mistakes  in  classification  by  being based on BFO,  which  relies  on
sophisticated theories concerning e.g. persistence across time, inherence of properties and
the  ontological  nature  of  information.  Such  uses  also  exist  in  other  domains  –  for
example, mereotopological theories have been used to support geographical information
systems.
Interestingly  for  our  purpose,  the  BFO  ontology  does  not  aim  (yet)  at  addressing
metaphysical issues raised by our most fundamental theories in contemporary physics.
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According to quantum field theory, the basic units seem to be excitations of fields, and
several problems appear for an ontology of particles in this context.  For instance,  the
number of field excitations seems not to be constant through time and, therefore, if we
want to identify particles with excitations of fields, we must accept that the number of
particles  within  a  physical  system is  not  constant  through  time7.  It  shows  that  it  is
difficult to view particles as continuants that would endure across time for long periods
(for a more general discussion of the issues raised by the category of object/particle in
physics, see French 2014). However, an ontology of material objects persisting for a long
time is consistent with the claim that these objects are composed of an always shifting
number of particles. This shows that it could make sense in the macroscopic domain to
conceive of material objects and their properties as enduring across time, as proposed by
BFO. 
Leaving  QFT  aside,  BFO allows  objects  to  have  both well-defined  positions  and
velocities8 at  a single time,  which is  at  odds with quantum mechanics.  However,  the
absence  of  mutual  constraints  between  positions  and  velocities  is  an  excellent
approximation in the macroscopic realm. Furthermore, BFO endorses a “container view”
of space, which holds that “spatial  regions are entities in their own right”  (Grenon &
Smith, 2004) – a view related to the “substantivalist” view (cf. for instance Le Poidevin
2004, Benovsky 2011 in the metaphysical literature and for instance Earman & Norton
1987, Pooley 2013 in the philosophy of general relativity literature). According to this
container view, endurants “can be located at or in them” (Grenon & Smith, 2004). BFO
considers that a reference frame is implicitly defined out of the formal apparatus of the
ontology  (typically,  the  reference  frame of  the  Earth),  and  that  spatial  and  temporal
regions are defined relatively to this reference frame (Arp, Smith & Spear, 2015). BFO’s
apparatus  that  includes  such  spatial  and  temporal  regions  (on  top  of  spatiotemporal
7  The compatibility of an ontology of particles with QFT is still debated – cf. for instance 
Halvorson and Clifton (2002) and Baker (2009). Also, Le Bihan (2015) argued that if we accept the 
reality of dispositions, then a description in terms of particles seem to be redundant with a description 
in terms of dispositions. In this section, we do not take stance on the reality of particles. 
8  In the sense that the process to which an object participates can have a well-defined instant 
velocity process profile (Smith, 2012). Note however that BFO does not require positions and 
velocities to be well-defined – so quantum mechanical constraints could be integrated in the future.
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regions, which are more in line with general relativity) has proven to be highly efficient
for formalizing special sciences like biomedicine.
Note also that the classical debate between substantivalism (the view that spacetime is a
substance that can exist independently of its material content) and relationism (the view
that  spacetime  is  the  name  of  the  collection  of  material  relations  obtaining  between
objects or events) has taken a new direction with general relativity. Whatever the best
ontological interpretation of general relativity and of any forthcoming theory of quantum
gravity turns out to be, it will likely need to account for three kinds of entities: spacetime
points, the metric field and matter fields9. However, such considerations are not useful for
dealing with some special sciences such as biomedicine, and therefore are currently not
yet integrated in BFO’s ontological framework.
It is worthy of attention that applied ontologists engaged in the BFO project take those
inputs  from  physics  seriously,  and  BFO  is  engaged  in  a  continuous  process  of
modification to account  for a larger portion of contemporary science.  Thus,  although
BFO’s ontological framework is based on principles drawn from analytic metaphysics, it
aims at integrating progressively inputs from advanced science. But our point here is the
following. Although some current features of BFO’s formal framework (classical time
and space, construal of material objects as independent continuants) may be classified as
belonging  to  analytic  metaphysics  and  are  not  yet  fully  aligned  with  contemporary
physics, they are adequate for most of biomedical science – and, arguably, several other
special sciences.  Therefore,  metaphysical principles found in analytic metaphysics have
proven to have a high heuristic value not only for philosophy of physics but also for
9  Any solution to Einstein’s equations of general relativity is a triple <M, g, T>, M being a 
manifold of points with coordinates and some weak topological structure, g being the metric field 
(which carries the information about the metric, i.e. the spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal relations
between spacetime points, and the local curvature of spacetime) and T the stress-energy tensor that 
relates in particular the metric field g to the matter field Φ (the distribution of matter, from which we 
may derivate the gravitational field). In this framework, it is not clear whether spacetime should be 
identified with the manifold, with the metric field, or with the conjunction of the manifold and the 
metric field. In fact, there are two distinct debates, one about the relationship between the manifold M 
and the metric field g or, moving from the mathematical level of description to the physical level, 
between spacetime points and the physical metric field described by g (cf. for instance Esfeld & Lam 
2006), the other one about the relationship between the manifold M and the metric field g on the one 
hand, and the matter field Φ on the other hand (see Pooley, 2016).
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applied ontologies, even though these principles were developed to describe the natural
world without engaging with contemporary physics.
Finally,  note  that  some  metaphysical  theories  have  been  used  in  both  philosophy  of
physics and applied ontology. Consider for example the metaphysical theory of disposi-
tion, on which there has been a long string of investigations in analytic metaphysics, in-
cluding milestones such as the influential work of Mumford (2003). Dispositions have
been invoked for interpreting quantum mechanics (see e.g. Dorato & Esfeld, 2010). They
also have been adapted in applied ontology to the framework of BFO by Röhl & Jansen
(2011), who endorse Mumford’s10 realism about dispositions and retain his distinction be-
tween a disposition and its categorical base – a framework that has been refined by an
analysis of the mereological structure of dispositions (Barton, Jansen & Ethier, 2018).
This  theory  was  then  used  to  formalize  various  kinds  of  entities,  such  as  diseases
(Scheuermann, Ceusters & Smith, 2009), functions (Spear, Ceusters & Smith, 2016) or
probabilities in medicine (Barton, Ethier, Duvauferrier & Burgun, 2017). Thus, a theory
that was developed out of the field of naturalized metaphysics later found its way in both
philosophy of physics and biomedical applied ontology.
2.3 Applied Ontology Sans Contemporary Physics
We  now  argue that views found in analytic  metaphysics may have a higher heuristic
value for biomedical applied ontology than views that would be founded on metaphysical
principles related to contemporary physics, for two reasons.
First,  an  ontology  built  upon  a  non-physicalist  methodology  might  facilitate
computations. Automatic reasoners such as Hermit (Shearer, Motik, & Horrocks, 2008)
or Pellet (Sirin, Parsia, Grau, Kalyanpur & Katz, 2007) are used to test the coherence of
an ontology and its logical consequences, but the computation times quickly become too
10  Note however that contrarily to Mumford who sees a disposition and its categorical base as 
identical at the token-level, Röhl & Jansen would see them as different entities that belong to two 
different categories, namely (set of) qualities vs. realizable entities.
10
long for any practical purpose if the ontology is too convoluted; using somewhat simpler
metaphysical principles from analytic  metaphysics (rather than a description based on
contemporary physics) might be a way to ensure that the logical consequences remain
computable in a  reasonable time for practical  purposes.  Additionally,  these principles
enable human users to browse and use the ontology more easily than if it was based on
e.g. quantum mechanical or relativistic principles. It is surely easier to use a description
in terms of independent entities localized in spatial regions, bearers of properties, and that
participate  in  processes  spanning  temporal  regions,  than  a  description  in  terms  of
excitation of a quantum field in a set of spacetime points accompanied by a metric field
and a matter field – or any other descriptions more in line with our current knowledge in
quantum gravity. Analytic metaphysics can provide the tools to articulate a description of
the former kind, and has been largely used in this respect, as reminded above.
Second,  we note  that  the  task  of  reducing  special  sciences  such  as  biology  or  even
classical physics on the basis of contemporary physics is not fully articulated, and highly
tentative since there are several physical views explaining different aspects of the world
and taken to be fundamental, in the sense that we do not have a unique most fundamental
description  of  the  world;  actually,  Ross,  Ladyman  & Collier  (2007)  –  among  other
philosophers  of science  – even think that  there is  no basis  for supposing that  such a
reduction is possible. For instance, quantum field theory and general relativity are our
most fundamental theories in this sense, and there is no reason to take one as being more
fundamental  than  the  other.  The  goal  of  finding  one  unified  fundamental  theory  of
physics might still  be far away, and we cannot put in standby all the rest of science,
waiting for this hypothetical next step in the history of theoretical physics to happen. It
would thus be illusionary to pretend basing an ontology of biomedicine on the ontology
of contemporary physics, as no such unique ontology has been found yet. As long as
there is no reduction all the way down of all special science to fundamental physics, we
must build applied ontologies of special sciences that stand independently of ontologies
of  fundamental  physics,  if  we  want  to  use  them for  practical  purposes.  Here  again,
analytic metaphysics can (and does) provide some tools for completing this goal, even if
they were developed independently of considerations of contemporary physics.
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Therefore, the heuristic justification of analytic metaphysics advocated by F&M does not
hold only in reference to philosophy of physics: applied ontology offers a relevant use of
analytic metaphysics not modeled on contemporary physics11.
3. Sealing the Fate of Analytic Metaphysics
In this section, we review F&M’s heuristic approach to metaphysics to alleviate some
tension in their account. In sub-section 3.1, we expose their heuristic justification and
their somewhat ambivalent attitude towards it, and extend it by taking into account the
results of section 2. In sub-section 3.2, we propose an amendment to their distinction
between “type I” and “type II” metaphysics. In sub-section 3.3, we examine what kind of
value the heuristic approach might provide to analytic metaphysics. In sub-section 3.4,
elaborating  on  an  analogy  provided  by  F&M  between  analytic  metaphysics and
mathematics, we argue that one does not need to be more ambivalent about the heuristic
justification  of  analytic  metaphysics  than  about  the  instrumental  justification  of
mathematics, and that F&M’s discomfort with the heuristic justification of metaphysics
may thereby be eased to some extent.
3.1 French & McKenzie’s heuristic justification
French & McKenzie’s  heuristic  justification  of  analytic  metaphysics  runs  as  follows.
First, some metaphysical tools have been used in philosophy of physics, such as Parfit’s
theory of personal identity in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics (Wallace,
2006) – although they have not been developed with this target discipline in mind. Sec-
ond, the development of physics cannot be predicted: therefore, any metaphysical work
might eventually be applicable to philosophy of physics in the future.
Similarly, as we argued, many theories that are now used in applied ontology were not
developed with this objective in mind – consider e.g. endurantist and perdurantist theories
11  We are thereby complementing French & McKenzie’s work, who seem to be sympathetic to 
the idea of justifying the toolbox approach with applied ontology (private correspondence).
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of trans-temporal identity (used in Grenon & Smith, 2004). Thus, metaphysical tools can
be helpful not only for philosophy (namely philosophy of physics), but also for science
(namely applied ontology; for other examples, see Bryant, 2017). By a direct adaptation
of F&M’s reasoning, since we do not know in which direction applied ontology will un-
fold  in  the  future  and  what  conceptual  tools  it  will  need,  metaphysical  works  that
presently find no application, or that may appear irrelevant to it, might eventually find
such an application in applied ontology in the future. This is especially obvious for the
kind of applied ontology that is the closest to empirical sciences: since the progress of
science cannot be predicted, the development of applied ontology that aims at fostering
data exchange in those sciences may not be fully anticipated. Therefore, any metaphysi-
cal work might eventually be applicable to it in the future.
F&M  (49)  express  some  ambivalence  towards  their  conclusion  though,  emphasizing
“how precarious [their] heuristic justification of metaphysics is”, as it is conditionalized
on its use in other disciplines: this support “will depend on the extent to which utilizing
extant packages instead of making everything to order is not a grossly inefficient way to
go about things”. They also mention the possible objection that the heuristic justification
of analytic metaphysical practice might make it similar to “monkeys at typewriters”, in
which only a vanishingly small part of the work in metaphysics might turn out to be
useful. Right after this statement, though, they point out that “this is the case, at least to
some extent, for science as well”. And they conclude that the prospects on the efficiency
of such practice are “not something that [they] feel anyone is in much a position to place
bets on”12.
12  Another statement reflecting the somewhat ambivalent attitude of F&M towards the heuristic
justification of analytic metaphysical practice is that “analytic metaphysics should not take place in a 
disciplinary vacuum”. Prima facie, this appears to suggest that a change in methodology is required, 
namely that metaphysical practice should be constrained by other disciplines. However, the rest of 
F&M’s article suggests instead that this statement should be interpreted as concerning the justification
of analytic metaphysics, which lies in other disciplines, such as philosophy of physics (as emphasized 
by F&M) or applied ontology (as emphasized by us). Indeed, they say elsewhere that “all that 
metaphysicians have to accept is the occasional raiding party from philosophers of science, keen (we 
hope) to see what they’re up to and what they can use for their own purposes” – suggesting that no 
methodological change is required for metaphysicians. Finally, they explicitly state their ambivalence 
when they recognize that “the picture [they] have painted is a complicated one, and that there are 
considerations pulling from both sides”, and call for “more nuanced positions on the basis of which 
more productive engagement between the two factions might be achieved”.
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We will now clarify several points to reach the conclusion that the heuristic justification
of  analytic  metaphysics is  qualitatively  similar  to  the  instrumental  justification  of
mathematics, and that one does not need to be ambivalent about the former if one is not
ambivalent  about  the  latter. As  a  first  step,  we  need  to  analyze  F&M’s  distinction
between two types of metaphysics.
3.2 The normative definition of type II metaphysics
F&M distinguish two kinds of analytic metaphysics that they call “type I” and “type II”:
Definition  1:  “Type  I  metaphysics  is  the  metaphysics  that  is  scientifically
disinterested and that, at least  prima facie, doesn’t  need  to be so interested, or
even that might have to be so disinterested.”
Definition  2:  “Type  II  metaphysics  is  the  metaphysics  that  is  scientifically
disinterested but that should not be so.”
Note that definition 2 is “normatively charged” (using this term as Grill 2013): it defines
type  II  metaphysics  as  being  overall  normatively  defective,  since  it  is  scientifically
disinterested when it should not be. But if type II metaphysics is defined as being overall
normatively  defective,  then  no  argument  could  show  it  to  be  overall  normatively
acceptable.  However,  this  possibility  is  left  open by F&M, since  they  point  out  that
support could “[…] be given to either Type I or Type II metaphysics via the heuristic
approach […]”13.  The fact  that  type II metaphysics is both normatively defective and
(possibly) supported by the heuristic approach appears as a tension.
We see two possible strategies to address this tension. The first one is to leave untouched
definition  2 of type II  metaphysics.  But then,  the  heuristics  approach does  not bring
13  Note that they remain very careful about the kind of support that the heuristic approach does 
indeed provide to the type I and type II metaphysics (and specify that this support is significantly 
conditionalized). But the mere consideration that type II metaphysics could be given some support is 
problematic, given the fact that type II metaphysics is defined as being normatively defective.
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support to  type II  metaphysics;  rather,  it  entails  that  there is  no type II  metaphysics:
indeed,  any  scientifically  disinterested  metaphysics  might  turn  out,  eventually,  to  be
useful for other disciplines. Therefore, it is never the case that it  should be (although it
certainly could be) scientifically concerned. In this case, the metaphysical tools (theories,
arguments, concepts) that were taken to belong to type II metaphysics actually belong to
type I  metaphysics.  However,  we then lose what  seems to be a  bona fide distinction
between two kinds of analytic metaphysics, type I metaphysics being intuitively more
justified than type II metaphysics because it does not directly contradict any scientific
claim.  The second possibility,  which we favor,  is  to  change the definition  of  type II
metaphysics by adding a proviso as follows:
Definition  2*:  Type  II  metaphysics  is  the  metaphysics  that  is  scientifically
disinterested  but  that  should  not  be  so  if  it  is  aimed  at  describing  reality
adequately.
Then, type II metaphysics is not normatively defective per se: it is only so when it claims
to describe reality adequately. But it may be effective if it is regarded as fulfilling other
tasks. If we replace definition 2 by definition 2* – as we will do in the remainder of the
article  –  the  heuristic  argument  does  indeed  provide  support  to  type  II  metaphysics,
which is allowed to remain scientifically disinterested when it only aims at fulfilling a
heuristic purpose for other disciplines14.
3.3 The value of analytic metaphysics
We  return  now  to  the  question  of  whether  analytic  metaphysics,  including  type II
metaphysics, is valuable, in the framework of the toolbox approach15. Note that, operating
14 Note that by fulfilling this heuristic purpose, type II metaphysics can help other disciplines (such 
as philosophy of physics, or applied ontologies of special sciences) to describe reality adequately once its 
tools are appropriately contextualized by those disciplines. Therefore, in definition 2*, “if it is aimed at 
describing reality adequately” should be understood as “if it is directly aimed at describing reality 
adequately”.
15 Again, we do not take stock here on whether analytic metaphysics is valuable for other 
reasons, unrelated to the toolbox approach.
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under  the  assumption  of  the  toolbox  approach,  it  is  clear  that  analytic  metaphysics
sometimes turns out to be valuable for other fields. But does it mean, as a consequence,
that metaphysics is always valuable simpliciter? In this section, we clarify this point and
show  that  the  two  possible  answers  to  this  question  lead  to  the  same  practical
consequences.
Ladyman & Ross and F&M provide many examples of analytic metaphysical theories
that discount scientific knowledge although they intend to describe entities about which
we have contradictory scientific knowledge; in these cases, analytic metaphysics fails to
describe reality and as a consequence, is not valuable, at least when it comes to the value
related  to  adequate  descriptions  of  the  world.  However,  the  heuristic  justification  by
F&M suggests that analytic metaphysics has, or may have in the future a different kind of
value,  namely  heuristic  value.  At  this  point,  one may ask whether  a  potential  future
heuristic value of analytic metaphysics grants it actual present value  simpliciter. There
are two possible answers to this question but, as we shall see, the two answers lead to the
same practical consequences: analytic metaphysics should not be discontinued. 
The first answer is not committed towards the existence of a current value of analytic
metaphysics,  grounded in a potential  future heuristic value.  Insofar as a metaphysical
view, principle, concept, or argument has or could come to have a heuristic value in the
future, this justifies the development of this artifact. According to the second, stronger,
interpretation,  any metaphysical  view,  concept,  principle  or  argument  has  value  now
because it has or could have heuristic value in the future16. We do not need to commit
here on whether  we should accept  this  stronger  statement:  it  is  enough to accept  the
weaker statement that analytic metaphysics may turn out to have heuristic value in the
future and that this sole fact justifies developing analytic metaphysics.
3.4 Building on the parallel with mathematics
16 In this approach, this actual value is arguably intrinsic, since it holds even though it might 
never be used by another field. This actual present intrinsic value thereby depends on a potential 
future extrinsic value.  
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We are now in a better position to (hopefully) ease F&M’s discomfort about the heuristic
justification of analytic metaphysics.  A comparison with mathematics will  clarify this
issue, elaborating on an analogy proposed by F&M themselves. Mathematics may have
(at least) two kinds of value. First, it might be the case that mathematics describes a part
of reality, as Platonists would claim – namely, mathematical reality – and therefore has
value (and alternative frameworks in philosophy of mathematics, such as intuitionism or
nominalism, may assign alternative kinds of value to mathematical practice). We will not
take a position here on whether mathematics  has such value.  Second, mathematics  is
sometimes used as a tool in other sciences – physics being an obvious example – in
which case it has some actual instrumental value; and because it might serve as a tool in
the  future,  any  mathematical  construct  has  some  potential  instrumental  future  value.
Similarly,  as  the  heuristic  justification  goes,  analytic  metaphysics  has  some potential
instrumental future value because of its potential use not only in philosophy of physics –
as emphasized by F&M – but also in the scientific domain of applied ontology – as we
emphasized in section 2. There is thus a strong parallel between the heuristic justification
of both mathematics and analytic metaphysics. 
Maybe  it  would  be  more  psychologically  reassuring  to  claim  that  both  analytic
metaphysics  and mathematics,  because  they  have  potential  future  instrumental  value,
actually  have  value  now  –  as  we  considered  in  subsection  3.3.  However,  this
psychological  reassurance  has  no  normative  bearing,  and  what  matters  is  that  this
potential  future  instrumental  value  provides  an  instrumental  justification  for  the
development  of  mathematical  or  analytic  metaphysical  theories,  whether  or  not  we
consider that this provide to them actual, present value.
This parallel between mathematics and analytic metaphysics implies that it is not at all
obvious that analytic metaphysics should be constrained by the needs of other disciplines
(such as philosophy of science or applied ontology). An external observer of mathematics
a few centuries ago might have thought that in order to maximize the instrumental value
of  mathematics,  it  should  evolve  in  a  constrained  –  rather  than  free  –  manner.  For
example, one might have suggested that mathematical progress should answer to specific
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needs from other sciences. Some mathematical tools have indeed been developed to solve
specific issues in physics, such as Fourier series to solve the heat equation. However, on
other  occasions,  physics  or  other  disciplines  find  already  pre-existing  tools  in
mathematics that were not developed to answer such issues. As mentioned by F&M (34),
Riemannian  geometry  may  have  originally  seemed  to  be  empty  of  any  instrumental
value,  but  it  later  found  an  application  with  General  Relativity.  Similarly,  some
investigations in number theory may have seemed useless at first, but were later used in
cryptography. It is not obvious that mathematics would have presently more instrumental
value if it had been constrained by its applications rather than let free to evolve in a free-
range manner. By analogy, it is not obvious that constrained metaphysics would have
more instrumental value than unconstrained metaphysics.
We might add here some argument to make our case. If all metaphysics would become
constrained, can we be sure that it would not dry the pool of ideas and tools in such a way
as reducing the overall richness of the discipline and, thereby, its usefulness for target
fields?  To  strengthen  this  idea,  note  that  the  two  disciplinary  fields  of  analytic
metaphysics  and  philosophy  of  science  rest  on  largely  different  (although  partly
overlapping)  intellectual  traditions.  The  organization  of  metaphysics  as  a  mostly
unconstrained field might thus enable the development and expression of specific skills in
its practitioners – such as creativity in building new metaphysical tools, or familiarity in
using them – the same way that the organization of mathematics as a dedicated field did.
Unless more evidence is given to the opposite thesis, it is not obvious that a constrained
metaphysics would have more future heuristic value than unconstrained metaphysics.
Another argument suggests ensuring the continuous existence of unconstrained analytic
metaphysics, namely the impossibility to predict new – scientific, philosophical or other –
fields that might emerge in the future. When metaphysics started to be largely applied to
applied ontology, this came as a surprise: “We find it remarkable that an activity that
traces its origins to the work of philosophers who lived more than two millennia ago has
become  central  to  the  development  of  modern  information  technology”  (Guarino  &
Musen, 2005). Who knows which other future fields might benefit from the progress of
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analytic metaphysics? Putting analytic metaphysics to order might skew it towards the
needs of present customers (such as philosophy of physics and applied ontology) and
restrict its potential applications to other as-yet-unforeseen fields17.
 
Thus,  we  may  summarize  the  lessons  learned  in  section  3  as  follows:  the  heuristic
approach justifies the practice of both type I and type II metaphysics (as redefined with
definition  2*),  in  the  same  way  that  the  practice  of  mathematics  is  justified
instrumentally.  This  is  true  independently  of  whether  the  potential  use  of  any
metaphysical tool or mathematical construct grants it some actual value. There are four
caveats  to  this  argument  though.  First,  one  could  argue  that  although  the
heuristic/instrumental justification is qualitatively similar for both analytic metaphysics
and  mathematics,  some  quantitative  differences  may  be  relevant.  For  example,
mathematics has been applied to a larger range of disciplines, and for a longer time, than
analytic metaphysics. Second, the methodology of metaphysics might be more precarious
than the methodology of mathematics: whereas the methods of mathematics are largely
settled and well accepted, there is more disagreement about the methods of metaphysics.
Maybe, for example, the appeal to intuitions or thought experiments makes metaphysics
methodologically  more  fragile.  And  certainly,  some  metaphysical  theories  go  wrong
when they pretend to  describe  a  portion  of  reality  about  which  we do have relevant
scientific  knowledge,  while  not  taking  this  knowledge  adequately  into  account  –  as
argued convincingly by L&R and F&M. Third, the structure of the academic field of
mathematics has arguably evolved because of its applications; indeed, a whole field of
“applied  mathematics”  has  been  developed  next  to  “pure  mathematics”.  Similarly,
17 A reviewer objected that this argument could be “used to defend the allocation of academic 
resources to any fanciful speculation at all”, such as “formal semantics for Klingon and Romulan. 
(After all, someone might someday decide to use Klingon for some currently unimagined purpose)”. 
We have two replies to this argument. First, Klingon (to take one of these two fictional languages 
drawn from Star Trek) might indeed have some applications someday; for example, it might provide 
some insights in linguistics. If the study of Klingon would start to bring such insights (the same way 
that analytic metaphysics has brought important insights to philosophy of physics and applied 
ontology), then it might be justified, indeed, to allocate some academic resources to its study (in 
proportion to the magnitude of its expected results). Second, it seems to us intuitively more likely that 
the purported study of the general structures of reality (which is the object of analytic metaphysics), 
because of its highly general scope of inquiry, would bring more insights to other fields than the study 
of the structure of an imaginary language (such as Klingon) would. However, and as noted by the 
reviewer, a specific account of the circumstances in which a high degree of generality would 
maximize utility for other fields is still lacking, and could be investigated in future works.
19
analytic metaphysics might be divided into two fields: “pure” analytic metaphysics, and
“applied”  analytic  metaphysics.  But  one  might  argue  that  this  is  already  what  has
happened with the emergence of the field of applied ontology; and that for the same kind
of reasons that motivate the continued existence of pure mathematics,  “pure” analytic
metaphysics  deserves  to  continue  an  autonomous  existence  next  to  applied  ontology.
Fourth, pure mathematicians  may be encouraged to periodically  step down from their
mathematical heavens and visit other scientific fields, to consider whether some of their
tools  could  bring  some  worthy  insight;  similarly,  analytic  metaphysicians  could  be
encouraged to wander out at times to consider whether some of their tools could bring
valuable contributions to other philosophical or scientific fields.
But  in  a  nutshell,  as  far  as  the  instrumental  justification  goes,  metaphysics  and
mathematics appear to be in qualitatively similar situations, and one therefore does not
need to be ambivalent about the heuristic justification of the former if one does accept the
instrumental justification of the latter. Thus, it might be a justification for those who think
that metaphysics does not have satisfactory epistemic credentials  (although we remain
neutral  here  on this  question)  and that  the  metaphysician  should  stop its  “bad faith”
(Bryant, 2017). And it could be the case that  analytic  metaphysics makes possible the
existence of some of the best naturalized metaphysics and applied ontologies, just like
freely  developed  mathematics  entitles  the  construction  of  some of  the  best  scientific
theories.
4. Conclusion
We have argued for  two points  in  this  article.  First,  French & McKenzie’s  heuristic
defense  of  analytic  metaphysics  can  be  extended  to  its  utility  for  applied  ontology.
Second, a comparison with mathematics shows that the toolbox approach suggests not
interfering with the whole field of analytic metaphysics even when it is inconsistent with
what we know about the world, according to our best current science.
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As a disclaimer, we do not claim that applied ontologies should remain based on analytic
metaphysics foundations only. It may become useful, when dealing with data systems in
the  field  of  e.g.  structural  engineering,  to  develop  ontologies  based  on metaphysical
principles  based on classical  physics.  It  might  even become useful  to  build  them on
metaphysical principles based on advanced physics principles if one wants to deal with
e.g. particle physics or cosmological data. As mentioned earlier, ontologies such as BFO
progressively incorporate such inputs from science. But given constraints of usability (as
explained  in  2.3)  by  domain  experts  such  as  medical  doctors  or  biologists,  we  will
anyway need ontologies using a level of description in terms of domain categories  –
although  those  categories  could  be  connected  with  categories  more  in  line  with
contemporary physics. Well-chosen principles inspired by both analytic and naturalized
metaphysics could serve as common foundations for those categories.
At the end of the day, we share the main ideas of Steven French and Kerry McKenzie and
want  to  warn  against  the  temptation  of  scientific  triage,  namely  that  the  intellectual
resources  should  be  distributed  differently,  according  to  expected  usefulness,  to  help
philosophy of physics to make its way. Philosophy of physics is not the only player in
town, and we do not see any convincing reason to believe that an active redistribution of
intellectual  resources  would  be  overall  useful,  either  for  the  philosophy  of  physics,
applied ontology or possible other yet-unexpected-fields.
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